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An integrated reading of Gandhi’s ideas, images, 
personal life, and political activities, at times inflicts 
considerable damage to the understanding of his 
thoughts. George Orwell’s (1949–2000) view of Gandhi 
as a moral saint and his ideas as “anti-humanistic” is a 
striking example. Adopting Orwell’s image, the 
philosopher Susan Wolf (1982), in an influential paper, 
questioned the very idea of moral saints. His saintly 
image is an important reason why there is little mention 
of Gandhi in academic moral philosophy. By showing 
that the image does not apply to his thoughts, we rescue 
Gandhi’s moral concepts from the perceived image 
of a saint.
The complex phenomenon of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) comprised a variety of elements: Gandhi’s personal image that led to ascriptions of 
 Mahatma, Bapu, father of the nation, half-naked fakir, and the 
like; his political life and leadership that played a major role in 
India’s independence from British rule; his original moral and 
political ideas and the striking methods through which he 
 articulated them.  In the existing literature on Gandhi, there is 
a prevalent sense that most of these elements are necessary for 
understanding Gandhi. It is no wonder, then, that much of the 
prominent contemporary literature on the phenomenon of 
Gandhi continues to be largely anecdotal, historical, and 
 biographical in character.1
 Beginning with the early expository work of Raghavan Iyer 
(1997), Bhikhu Parekh (2000), Anthony Parel (2000), and a 
few others, there is growing scholarly interest in recent years 
to give a theoretical shape to Gandhi’s social, political, reli-
gious, and moral ideas; the goal being to form an abstract un-
derstanding of his thoughts. The emerging literature attempts 
to interpret Gandhi’s moral and political thought as an alterna-
tive to classical liberalism and political realism (Devji 
2005/2012; Mantena 2012; Kapila 2015; Mehta 2010). The un-
derlying idea is to see how Gandhian ideas contribute to the 
ongoing theoretical debates in political and moral domains. 
Since the focus is on Gandhi’s thoughts, this enterprise 
 requires an examination of the conceptual underpinnings of 
his ideas, largely independent of his personal life and political 
activities. Akeel Bilgrami (2003: 4159) views the project 
as follows:
Gandhi’s thought and his ideas about specifi c political strategies in 
specifi c contexts fl owed from ideas that were very remote from poli-
tics; instead they fl owed from and were integrated to the most abstract 
epistemological and methodological commitments. The quality of his 
thought has sometimes been lost because of the other images Gandhi 
evolves—a shrewd politician and a deeply spiritual fi gure.
 There is a strong case, thus, for viewing Gandhi as a philo-
s opher rather than just a pragmatic politician (Goyal 2019; 
Taylor and Perry 2010). 
Studying Gandhi
On the face of it, it seems reasonable that a theoretical exami-
nation of Gandhi’s moral and political ideas will be largely 
independent of his title of Mahatma or his leadership of the 
Congress party. After all, we need not inquire into the personal 
attributes and political distinctions of Karl Marx or Mao 
 Zedong to evaluate the quality of their thoughts, not to mention 
more abstract thinkers such as Immanuel Kant or John Rawls. 
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In each case, a study of their seminal work is enough. The 
point we are trying to make here is that although there is much 
knowledge about the personal and political lives of Marx and 
Mao, such information is usually reserved for their biographical 
and historical sketches. They are seldom used for Marxist and 
Maoist studies; a discussion of Marx’s theory of alienation and 
Mao’s theory of contradiction does not require a study of their 
lives. Why, then, should it be otherwise for seminal Gandhian 
ideas, such as ahimsa, satyagraha and swaraj? 
Yet, it is hard to locate such a separation between biographi-
cal and theoretical issues in Gandhian studies. This is because, 
beyond the methodological plausibility of Bilgrami’s project, 
the separation between Gandhi, the person, and his “theory” 
may not be as sharp in practice. There are two related reasons 
for this.
First, each of the three elements—image, activities, ideas—
of the Gandhi phenomenon has had a powerful infl uence on 
our understanding of the same.  For example, both Gandhi’s 
popular image of Mahatma and his celebrated political inter-
ventions, such as in Chauri Chaura, have been viewed as 
central to understanding the Gandhi phenomenon (Amin 
1984, 1995). Thus, it is not surprising that scholars often con-
tend that Gandhi’s moral and political ideas are inseparably 
integrated with his personal and political lives. For instance, 
the well-known historian and Gandhian scholar Vinay Lal 
(2019) remarks that we may understand Gandhi properly only 
when we pay attention to every moment of his life, including 
his morning ablutions, diet, walks, and prayers. Indeed, some 
authors hold that, contra Bilgrami, Gandhi’s ideas were “de-
rived” from his personal and political experience, rather than 
the other way round (Kolge 2017, 2020). 
Second, Gandhi’s own writings are often in the form of com-
ments and wise dictums, with occasional oblique references to 
classical religious traditions. Despite an enormous oeuvre of 
100 volumes, Gandhi never engaged in rigorous argumenta-
tion to develop his original ideas. With regards to his central 
notion of satyagraha (desire for truth), Gandhi relates that 
this idea arose from “prayerful search” rather than sustained 
analytical refl ection: “I claim to be a votary of truth from my 
childhood. It was the most natural thing to me. My prayerful 
search gave me the revealing maxim Truth is God, instead of 
the usual one God is Truth” (M K Gandhi 1942/1999: 163). At 
no place, during this remark, does Gandhi explain the terms of 
the maxim.
Even the new theoretical approaches on Gandhi, noted 
above, continue to be mainly political–historical in character. 
No doubt, there is less emphasis on Gandhi’s life and personality, 
and more attention on the meaning of his words, actions, and 
their connectedness; yet, the shift in emphasis comes in degrees 
rather than principle. In that sense, the extant literature 
continues to have a marked biographical dimension.2 Perhaps, 
in the absence of standard textual material from Gandhi, rele-
vant segments of his life itself are viewed as “text” to be sup-
plemented on occasion with his intriguing “prayerful” 
 remarks. The hope is that, with suffi cient scholarly care, 
 something like an abstract picture will duly emerge so that 
 attention may then be directed at the picture itself.3 It remains 
unclear though as to how one may address Bilgrami’s worry 
that some crucial aspects of Gandhi’s thought might have been 
lost in the process. Unless care is taken to disentangle the dis-
parate elements in the Gandhi phenomenon, it may happen 
that an ascribed image of Gandhi infects the evaluation of 
his thoughts. 
In this paper, as a case study, we examine ascriptions of 
sainthood to Gandhi to see what effect they have on some pro-
posed interpretations of his thoughts. No doubt, the ascription 
of sainthood is an extreme case of the issue of ascribing imag-
es to Gandhi; yet, in our view, similar approaches permeate 
much of the literature in Gandhian studies. A detailed study of 
the case, thus, is meant to highlight some of the dimensions of 
the largely unexplored general problem with “integrated” 
studies on Gandhi.
As we will see, a range of authors have ascribed sainthood 
to Gandhi, either as tribute or as invective. The fi rst and minor 
problem with these ascriptions is that they do not have any 
basis either in popular usage or in the personality of Gandhi; 
the problem is minor insofar as it is restricted to the personal 
image of Gandhi for the few who take the ascription of saint-
hood seriously. In any case, we are not really concerned with 
the folklore of Gandhi’s personal images, such as Mahatma 
and Bapu, even if they have some anthropological basis; as 
emphasised, the truth or falsity of such images is not our 
 primary concern. Our central concern is with the second and 
major problem, which arises when some authors use characte-
ristics of the ascribed image to evaluate the quality of Gandhi’s 
thoughts along with his personality. 
Ascription of Saintliness
George Orwell’s (1949–2000) famous essay on Gandhi carried 
precisely this (second) detrimental effect in the discipline of 
moral philosophy. Orwell (1949–2000: 462–63) characterised 
Gandhi as a “moral saint” and then criticised this notion as 
“anti-humanistic” among other things; that is, in ascribing an 
image to Gandhi, Orwell not only targeted him as a person on 
the basis of the ascribed image, but also questioned his moral 
beliefs from the same ground. 
It is instructive to distinguish Orwell’s characterisation of 
Gandhi as a saint from other ascriptions of saintliness. For 
 example, Arundhati Roy (2014) has used the notion of a saint 
polemically to question the moral validity of Gandhi’s popular 
image. That is, Roy subscribes to the moral value of ascribing 
saintliness to someone, but she denies the ascription to Gandhi 
by citing selective incidents and remarks from his life.4 Roy 
has almost nothing to say on the more scholarly task of analys-
ing the abstract structure of Gandhi’s thinking.5
Orwell’s analysis, in contrast, is more subtle and theoreti-
cally challenging. He holds that Gandhi properly exemplifi es 
the characteristics of moral saintliness in his life and thoughts. 
However, according to Orwell, the very idea of saintliness is 
morally and politically problematic; so is Gandhi as a person 
and thinker. In effect, Orwell suggests that the dubious idea of 
moral saints shows why Gandhi’s personal character and his 
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thoughts need not be viewed as carrying intellectual and 
 moral weight. For its striking critical angle, Orwell’s paper 
continues to be widely discussed.6 
In our view, the literature initiated by Orwell’s paper has 
played a largely detrimental role in preventing a serious philo-
sophical evaluation of Gandhi’s thoughts, as Bilgrami cau-
tioned. Since Orwell is more concerned with the concept of 
saintliness, with Gandhi as his prime example, his literary 
piece has given rise to much discussion in moral philosophy. 
The distinguished philosopher Susan Wolf (1982) extends 
 Orwell’s objections against Gandhi to argue that moral saints 
are irrelevant to common people; her paper led to a substantial 
literature in moral philosoph, some of which we will see.7 
Academic philosophers almost immediately mention this 
literature whenever some interest is shown in Gandhi’s moral 
philosophy. This is the contemporary challenge we have in 
mind for the present paper. 
 Our concern in this paper is not so much to engage with the 
literature on moral saints per se, but to see what effect the 
asc ription of moral saintliness has on the “quality” of represen-
tations of Gandhi’s thought, as Bilgrami put it. In particular, we 
will investigate whether the alleged features of moral saints—
anti-humanistic, reactionary, and devoid of personal well- 
being—indeed apply to Gandhi’s moral thought. We must note 
that although there is substantial literature on moral saints, 
we do not know of any signifi cant literature that examines the 
ascription to Gandhi. It could be that the ascription of saint-
hood has been taken for granted in the West because of 
Gandhi’s popular image as an ascetic, fragile, simple, simply-
dressed, skinny, and non-violent person (Finkelstein 2012).
Since we are not primarily concerned with the concept of a 
saint, but rather with the ascription of saintliness to Gandhi, it 
is instructive to briefl y investigate where that ascription came 
from. It appears that Gandhi was occasionally viewed as a 
saint primarily by authors writing in English.8 The vernacular 
equivalent of “saint”—namely sant, as it is typically used for 
reformist religious fi gures like Surdas, Tulsidas, Kabir, Ramdas, 
and many others—is not commonly used for Gandhi. In the 
common vernacular, Gandhi is known as Mahatma. So, perhaps, 
the problem with the ascription of saintliness lies in translating 
“Mahatma” as saint. A brief history of the title  Mahatma might 
be helpful at this point.
There is no known ceremony or authority that conferred 
Gandhi with the title Mahatma. Until recently, most authors 
believed that Rabindranath Tagore called Gandhi a Mahatma 
for the fi rst time (Lelyveld 2011: 20). In 1996, a document from 
Sabarmati Ashram revealed that Gandhi was fi rst called 
 Mahatma in a meeting in 1915 (Dave 2013); this was later 
mentioned by Gandhi’s biographer Ramchandra Guha (2013). 
It seems that Gandhi came to be called Mahatma because he 
was broadly viewed as a messiah of the poor, a great soul who 
devoted his life for the people to secure freedom from poverty, 
untouchability, and foreign rule.
The title ascribed to Gandhi is part of the common practice of 
conferring titles on prominent leaders: Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar 
Tilak, Babasaheb Bhim Rao Ambedkar, Netaji Subhas Chandra 
Bose, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and the like. In fact, the title 
Mahatma was also conferred on the social activist Jotirao 
Phule; Gandhi himself conferred the title to Munshiram Vij of 
Gurukul. In any case, the title of Mahatma was routinely used for 
earlier scholars and social reformers, such as Basaveshwara 
(1105–67), Lalon Shah (1772–1890), and Ayyankali (1863–1941); 
some leading Jain scholars and thinkers are also viewed as 
Mahatma.9 The title thus applies to a mixed bag of tall com-
munity leaders, prominent scholars and thinkers, respected 
social reformers, noble spirits, and the like; it is just a mark of 
respect in a community. Nothing very specifi c about personal 
qualities and thoughts of the titled persons follow from such 
titles. In particular, the title Mahatma does not necessarily 
carry religious signifi cance. To emphasise, the title Mahatma 
is essentially a mark of how people view a respectable fi gure; it 
is a tribute to a person, not really a comment on the quality of 
his thoughts.
It appears, therefore, that Orwell’s remark that the “claims 
of saintliness” had been “made on [Gandhi’s] behalf” has little 
factual basis.10 As we saw, while only a few authors writing in 
English use saint to portray Gandhi, the more widespread asc-
ription views him as a Mahatma, and there is no signifi cant 
overlap between the two images. So, either Orwell is ascribing 
saintliness to Gandhi on his own or he is misconstruing the 
popular image of Mahatma as a saint. To repeat, Orwell and 
others cannot claim to have found some historical basis of 
asc ribing saintliness to Gandhi from the fact that Gandhi was 
fondly viewed as Mahatma by the people of India.
In contrast to Mahatma, sainthood in the Western context is 
primarily a religious concept. The title of saint is formally 
conferred posthumously to people who exemplify exceptional 
holy characters in their life. Although Orwell gives no clue as 
to where his idea of saintliness comes from, Wolf gives a clear 
signal by citing Mother Teresa as her prime example of a saint. 
It goes without saying that there is no real analogy between the 
Christian nun Mother Teresa who devoted her life to cha rity 
and the mass leader Gandhi who devoted his life to political 
freedom of people. In fact, as Mark Shepard (1990–2004: 5) 
informs, “Gandhi objected when people called him a saint 
trying to be politician.”11 Thus, we may conclude that there is 
no basis from common usage for calling Gandhi a saint. Is 
there, then, a conceptual basis of doing so?
Two Aspects of Saintliness
There are two possible ways to speak of saintliness in the con-
text of Gandhi: that he was himself a saint, and that he advo-
cated moral saintliness. The former refers to the person of 
Gandhi, ascribing a saintly image to him; the latter refers to 
the concepts and ideas that Gandhi held and advocated. Even 
though there is hardly any popular basis for ascribing a saintly 
image to Gandhi, it is clear that Orwell thinks otherwise. The 
issue now is: even if Gandhi, the person, is viewed as a saint,12 
does this saintliness necessarily attach to Gandhi’s moral and 
political views as well? As noted earlier, regarding the meth-
odological plausibility of distinguishing between an author’s 
personal predilections and his (abstract) thoughts, it is  obvious 
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that these ways of speaking are largely independent of each 
other. A saintly person need not advocate saintliness, and the 
advocacy of saintliness does not require that the advocate be a 
saint. In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the latter. 
Before we do so, it is instructive to note that Orwell does not 
make this crucial distinction. Commenting on Gandhi’s saint-
liness, Orwell (1949–2000: 459) says, “his whole life was a sort 
of pilgrimage in which every act was signifi cant.” Following 
this familiar portrayal, Orwell uses several anecdotal refer-
ences to Gandhi’s personal life, such as his vegetarianism, as 
reasons for claiming that Gandhi affi rmed saintliness as a 
moral principle. We will shortly examine the theoretical prob-
lems with affi rming saintliness to Gandhi’s moral principles. 
For now, we are pointing out the methodological problem with 
Orwell’s strategy of understanding Gandhi’s ideas on the basis 
of the saintly image ascribed to his personal life. 
The problem is analogous to understanding and evaluating 
Aristotle’s theory of justice from his sexist comments. There is 
textual evidence that Aristotle was guilty of making misogy-
nistic observations of women. However, Aristotle’s conceptual 
claim of “justice means equity” does not lose its theoretical 
value because of his alleged misogyny; it will be fallacious to 
regard his defi nition of justice as unjust. When we examine 
Aristotle’s moral philosophy, we judge his conceptual proposi-
tions and not his personal ability to obey his own moral ideas.
Similarly, we know Gandhi regarded non-violence as a 
central moral ideal, yet, in his personal life, Gandhi is said to 
have, sometimes, violated the principle of non-violence: for 
example, once, he allegedly coerced his wife to clean toilets. 
One can possibly fi nd other instances of personal violence in 
Gandhi’s life such as compelling members of his family to 
follow vegetarianism. But in light of the Aristotle example, it is 
clear that, even if Gandhi may have himself failed to follow his 
principle of non-violence, it does not delegitimise the principle 
itself and its connection with the concepts of moral truth and 
moral agent in Gandhi’s thought. 
Orwell, therefore, is patently wrong in inferring, from the 
cited acts of coercion, that Gandhi was a moral perfectionist, 
and therefore, he advocated saintliness as a principle; we will 
soon see how this move to moral perfectionism infl uenced 
 Orwell’s evaluation of Gandhi’s views on friendship, welfare, 
non-violence, etc. The cited personal references may be used 
to legitimately judge whether Gandhi was a saint in some 
given sense, but not whether Gandhi’s moral views promoted 
saintliness (or not). For the latter step, we need to examine the 
proposed concept of saintliness to see whether it applies to 
Gandhi’s thoughts. For this reason, we are trying to avoid 
discussing whether Gandhi himself may be viewed as a saint, 
a theoretically irrelevant issue in our view. 
In this context, we note that Orwell’s essay “Refl ections on 
Gandhi” (1949/2000) is a response to Gandhi’s autobiography 
The Story of My Experiments with Truth (1927). This autobio-
graphy is an assembly of anecdotes, personal refl ections, and 
pithy remarks on a wide variety of human issues; it is question-
able whether it can be used to portray stable, abstract views of 
the author, especially when it is used as the only source for 
doing so.13 Orwell’s study thus suffers from yet another serious 
scholarly limitation. However, as noted, the lack of theoreti-
cally oriented texts is a global challenge to a conceptual study 
of Gandhi’s ideas. Even if Gandhi used several moral concepts 
like truth, non-violence, liberation, non-cooperation, moral 
agency, and the like, which seem to form a coherent moral 
framework, Gandhi did not explain the location of these 
concepts in the framework, as noted. The present point is that 
the absence of scholarly literature cannot be fi lled up by 
selective references to Gandhi’s practices as narrated in his 
autobiography and similar material.
Friendship 
Regarding Gandhi’s thoughts, Orwell’s (1949–2000: 466)  basic 
complaint is that his saintly moral ideals have an “anti- 
humanistic tendency;” that is to say Gandhi’s thought is irrele-
vant, perhaps even detrimental, to humans. According to 
 Orwell, moral saints like Gandhi advocate and live by some 
notion of moral perfection which excludes ideas of friendship 
and personal love. This is because both friendship and per-
sonal love are restricted to local, context-bound relationships, 
while moral saints advocate the notion of universal love, “love 
for all.” Orwell (1949–2000: 462) states that this dictum is in 
confl ict with the general human need for love for someone in 
particular and for personal friendship.
Orwell arrives at this conclusion by fi rst ascribing the image 
of a saint to Gandhi without any basis. Second, by deducing 
that moral saints are moral perfectionists without giving any 
reason and then, he relies on anecdotal evidence from Gandhi’s 
autography to confi rm that Gandhi practised moral perfection. 
Next, following the assertion, his argument goes like this: 
humans seek friendship and love, love means loving someone 
more than others; also, good friendship sometimes requires 
moral failure, such as telling lies, which is a violation of moral 
perfection; therefore, Gandhi’s saintliness—which necessarily 
involves ideas of “love for all” and “moral perfection,” accord-
ing to Orwell—precludes good friendship and loving relation-
ships. Hence, Orwell (1949–2000: 463) warns that Gandhi’s 
ideas are “anti-humanistic” and “human beings must avoid 
such saintliness.”
As an aside, we note that Orwell makes a similar complaint 
about Gandhi’s notion of non-violence. Since, according to 
 Orwell, Gandhi is a moral perfectionist due to his saintliness, 
Gandhi cannot allow any exception to moral ideals such as 
non-violence. As a consequence, non-violence results in uncon-
ditional pacifi sm which may be used as a tool only against 
 benign enemies such as the British empire in India; it will fail 
against, say, Nazi violence. As against Orwell, David Hardiman 
(2003: 61) shows that Gandhian non-violence was in fact 
pursued as an option against Nazi violence. Moreover, follow-
ing a careful study of Gandhian non-violence, many authors 
suggest that Gandhi did allow for principled, context-bound 
exceptions (Goyal forthcoming; Finkelstein 2012). Hence, 
 Orwell’s understanding fails from several directions. However, 
once we have shown Orwell’s dependence on moral perfec-
tionism, we set the topic of non-violence aside because it 
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has not played a signifi cant role in the philosophical discus-
sion on moral saints.
Turning to the concept of friendship, Faisal Devji’s (2005–12) 
analysis of Gandhi’s moral and political beliefs possibly refutes 
Orwell’s understanding of Gandhi’s alleged views on friend-
ship.14 Devji (2005–12: 80–81) suggests that Gandhi insisted 
on developing friendship between different social groups to 
resolve differences arising out of prejudice, such as communal 
prejudice between Hindus and Muslims. Devji argues that 
Gandhi regarded friendship as a non-contractual disinterested 
relationship, meaning that friendship is a selfl ess and volun-
tary relationship. This is a fairly standard conception of friend-
ship, distinct from natural brotherly relationships as well as 
contractual spousal or collegial relations. Thus, according to 
Devji, the concept of friendship plays a signifi cant role in 
Gandhi’s thoughts on social relations. 
However, Orwell may be placing his emphasis on aspects 
of friendship that are somewhat different from what Devji 
asc ribes to Gandhi. According to Orwell, “moral corruptibility” 
and “reacting on each other” are important characteristics of 
the notion of friendship. Orwell claims that, in view of Gandhi’s 
moral perfectionism, these characteristics are absent in the 
latter’s conception of friendship. Hence, Orwell argues that 
since Gandhi’s moral good does not cover the good of friend-
ship, it is irrelevant to humans. Following Orwell,  Cocking and 
Kennett (2000: 296) also argue that “the nature of our com-
mitment to our … friends is inherently likely to lead us into 
moral danger.” Thus, Cocking and Kennett partly agree with 
Orwell that the good of friendship is not the same as  moral 
good; in other words, they claim that good friendship often 
requires moral exceptions for the sake of the friend. 
We note that, unlike Orwell, Cocking and Kennett do not 
comment on the consequences of their view on friendship for 
moral thought itself; they simply suggest a “less moralised” 
version of friendship. They agree with Orwell only insofar as 
they argue that friendship is based on what they call “mutual 
drawing account,” which sometimes requires one to make 
moral exceptions for the sake of a friend (Cocking and Kennett 
2000: 296).15 The interest here is that while Cocking and Ken-
nett agree with Orwell that friendship might require making 
moral exceptions, they do not further require, rightly, that the 
standard of moral good be lowered to make it “relevant” for 
humans. An obvious option is not to treat friendship as a moral 
concept at all, as we will soon see. 
The detour to Cocking and Kennett’s ideas is meant to 
 highlight the insuffi ciency of Orwell’s argument that a moral 
thought is “inhuman” if it does not make space for moral cor-
ruptibility involved in friendship, which he thinks is the case 
with Gandhi. Orwell’s claim on Gandhi’s thought raises the 
query: Is it the burden of moral theory to make space for lack 
of morality in human practices? Prima facie, it seems that 
such a demand on moral theory runs counter to its very idea 
which aims to explain the distinction between moral and 
 immoral by setting criteria for distinguishing between blame-
worthy and praiseworthy actions. That is, if some action is 
 acknowledged as blameworthy, then accommodating it 
within the concept of morality violates the very foundation of 
a moral theory. 
Needless to say, this is not the place to fully discuss the 
 nature of moral theory. All we wish to point out here is that 
Orwell’s claim—that there is a direct confl ict between friend-
ship and moral perfectionism—affects Gandhi’s moral con-
cerns only when some unproblematic notion of moral perfec-
tion legitimately applies to Gandhi, and that notion covers the 
concept of friendship. In our view, Orwell failed to establish 
the suggested connections. Apart from conceptual confusions 
regarding the idea of a morality and the subtle concept of 
friendship, our main objection to Orwell’s analysis is that, 
 except for leaning on the dubious image of a saint, Orwell pro-
vides no empirical and textual support at all to establish that 
the picture obtains for Gandhi. We conclude that there is noth-
ing in Orwell’s arguments so far to prevent Gandhi from hold-
ing a strong notion of moral good along with the standard 
view of friendship as a detached and voluntary relationship.
However, the preceding objection does not immediately 
 apply to the maxim love for all, which Orwell takes to be 
 another closely related feature of moral saintliness. This is 
 because, unlike Orwell’s claims on Gandhi’s idea of friendship 
that are merely based on unsupported conjectures, the maxim 
does not suffer from lack of textual and conceptual support. 
Gandhi himself suggests something similar to love for all in his 
advocacy of service to the other; he holds that the concept of 
service to the other (sev) applies for the “upliftment of all” 
(sarvodaya). We, thus, turn to the idea of love for all to see if it 
comprises of anti-humanistic elements.
Welfare 
Susan Wolf (1982) agrees with Orwell’s basic contention that 
there is a necessary confl ict between the advocacy of universal 
love and some forms of personal love. Wolf’s ideas are philo-
sophically interesting because she extends Orwell’s criticism 
of moral saints to attack received theories in moral philosophy, 
such as utilitarianism and deontology. It is interesting for us 
because, as noted, Gandhi certainly advocates some version of 
universal love, which, according to Wolf, is philosophically 
problematic. Wolf is unlike Cocking and Kennett (2000), in 
that she is not arguing for a less moralised version of personal 
relationships such as friendship, rather she is more like Orwell 
in insisting on a less demanding conception of morality. 
Wolf’s basic idea is that any system of morality, which advo-
cates the view that humans shall promote the “welfare of the 
other as much as possible,” precludes adequate recognition of 
non-moral interests.16 She says that the presence of heightened 
moral virtues in an individual is bound to “crowd out non-moral 
virtues” and “personal interests” (Wolf 1982: 421). That is, 
people devoted to moral virtues like welfare of the other either 
do not have interest in non-moral values like playing the 
violin, or they allow limited value to non-moral interests 
which do not uphold welfare interests (Wolf 1982: 420). As 
such, even though Wolf agrees that welfare of the other is a 
moral good, she argues that maximising welfare of the other 
cannot be the demand of “common-sense morality.” She 
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suggests that there is a confl ict between pursuing non-moral 
interests and promoting the welfare of all, such that they restrict 
the space for each other; hence, to allow space for non-moral 
interests, the scope of welfare ought to be restricted. Several 
points can be raised in connection with this proposal.
Just as Wolf wants to limit the scope of welfare in view of 
the alleged confl ict with non-moral interests, the opposite 
res ponse suggesting limiting non-moral interests for the sake 
of welfare can also be made on exactly the same ground. In 
fact, the latter seems to be the case in reality. We restrict our 
non-moral interests and values to cater to others, especially 
those who are vulnerable and need help. We fi nd it morally 
repugnant when, instead of attending to an injured person on 
the road, someone drives past her to get to a tennis match. It is 
morally repugnant because we expect the agent to prefer the 
moral interest to serve the other over non-moral interests, 
however signifi cant the non-moral interests may be. In that 
sense, prioritising welfare over, say, watching a tennis match 
may be viewed as an aspect of common-sense morality. 
However, in her argument against crowding out of non-moral 
interests by moral interests, Wolf does nont adequately con-
sider the consequences of such crowding out of moral interests 
by non-moral ones. In fact, she expresses concern over regard-
ing  moral interests at the highest priority in the taxonomy of 
 human interests.
Orwell’s and Wolf’s criticism of the maxim “welfare of the 
other as much as possible” is that enacting such a demand 
 results in a person not having any non-moral interests which 
do not directly or indirectly promote welfare of the other. 
 Orwell and Wolf (1982: 438) are opposed to the idea that the 
welfare interest becomes an ever-present fi lter for evaluating 
every other interest in human life. That is, they interpret this 
saintly view of morality as dictating that any human interest 
which does not uphold the welfare interest, fails the test of 
morality and is, thus, not worthy of human interest. The 
strength of their argument comes from the fact that indivi-
duals in fact have several interests apart from welfare of the 
other; if welfare is the highest and the only justifi able interest, 
then every other interest can at best be of secondary value. As 
Wolf (1982: 436) famously says, “one can be perfectly wonder-
ful without being perfectly moral.”
Although there is no clear textual elaboration, it is not diffi -
cult to see where Orwell’s and Wolf’s rather austere notion of 
welfare is coming from. There is a common view of saints, 
 upheld in religions such as Christianity, where saints appear as 
lean, frugal, ascetic, fi rmly moralistic, and who sacrifi ce the 
normal pleasures of life in single-minded service of the poor.17 
Wolf’s mention of Mother Teresa as a paradigmatic example of 
a moral saint shows what Wolf is looking at. Personally, we 
may disagree with Wolf’s rather negative portrayal of Mother 
Teresa, but that is beside the point here. All that Wolf has to 
say about the non-negotiable character of the idea of welfare 
mooted by moral saints seems to follow from the austere 
conception of moral saints.18
Assigning such a Christian view of moral saints to Gandhi is 
unjustifi ed. This is so because, as noted in connection with 
Devji’s treatment of friendship, there is a signifi cant presence 
of the notion of detachment in Gandhi’s thought, which nei-
ther Wolf nor Orwell seem to notice. Ga ndhi’s nascent notion 
of  detachment can be culled from his concept of anāsakti yoga 
(the practice of non-attachment) which he introduces in his 
translation of the Bhagvad Gītā (M K Gandhi 1927–2011). 
Gandhi’s notion of detachment is such that in the cases of con-
fl ict  between various kinds of interests—immoral, non-moral, 
and moral—detachment plays a regulatory function in the 
“choice” of interests (Goyal manuscript in preparation). The 
notion of detachment takes welfare of the other as a desirable 
moral good and advocates detachment from one’s biases 
(class, caste, religion, political interests, and personal compul-
sions) in  order to make an unbiased—alternatively, truthful—
choice when the moral good of welfare of humans is at stake. 
Let us see how this brief picture of Gandhi’s notion of detach-
ment  interacts with Wolf’s idea of moral saints.
The fi rm presence of detachment in Gandhi’s framework 
shows that Gandhi is aware that welfare of the other is not the 
only interest one should, or in fact, entertain. The moral sug-
gestion is that one ought to set aside other interests when in 
confl ict with the welfare of the other. In this sense, detach-
ment regulates the input of interests in an individual’s life. As 
we saw, giving priority to the welfare of the other in situations 
of confl ict is pretty much in tune with common sense morality 
as well. The notion of detachment grounds common intuition 
in the moral sense of the agent. The very presence of an 
arbitra ting principle like detachment shows that Gandhi is not 
 endorsing a complete crowding out of non-moral interests. 
Thus, it seems that even if the notion of promoting the 
“welfare of the others as much as possible” appears in Gandhi’s 
thought, it does not amount to a complete crowding out of non-
moral interests, as Wolf argues to be the case for moral saints. 
To conclude, we have repeatedly mentioned the glaring lack 
of scholarly investigation on the part of Orwell in his portrayal 
of Gandhi; a similar complaint applies to Wolf since she uncri-
tically adopts Orwell’s perspective on Gandhi when, in fact, 
she had Mother Teresa in her mind. Orwell and Wolf’s over- 
reliance on a false perceived image of Gandhi as a moral saint, 
amplifi ed by their scholarly limitations, leads them to miss 
 aspects of Gandhi’s thinking that are crucial for understand-
ing Gandhi’s conception of moral good. As a result, the preva-
lence of an image drowned the attractive quality of Gandhi’s 
moral thinking. 
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Notes
 1 We have in mind literature, such as that of 
Brown (1972, 2008), Sarkar (1989), Amin (1995), 
Finkelstein (2012), Guha (2013, 2018), and 
Rajmohan Gandhi (2017), among others. 
2  This perspective on Gandhian scholarship applies 
to the literature, cited above, that pays a tribute 
to Gandhi’s thoughts, as well as that which 
basically aims for a negative portrayal of Gandhi, 
such as Roy (2014), Anderson (2012), and others.
 3 The methodological problems of studying 
Gandhi and how to work around them are dis-
cussed in Goyal (forthcoming). In Goyal (man-
uscript in preparation), it is discussed how to 
extract some abstract view of Gandhi’s thoughts 
from the stated “biographical” literature.
 4 Several scholars have questioned the evidential 
basis of Roy’s criticism (R Gandhi 2015; Kolge 
2017).
 5 Mohan and Dwivedi (2017: 9) expand on Roy’s po-
lemical strategy to declare fi rst that “M K Gandhi 
was guilty of most of the crimes … anti-Semitism, 
apartheid, caste discrimination, misogyny, exploi-
tation of the poor.” The authors then complain 
that people have covered up these “mistakes” 
“in his corpus to present a suitably saintly 
Gandhi” (Mohan and Dwivedi 2017: 228). 
 6 Even the popular news portal, Scroll.in (2017), 
reprinted Orwell’s entire article on Gandhi’s 
150th birthday.
 7 The philosophical literature that followed 
Wolf’s work includes seminal papers such as 
Adams (1984), Cocking and Kennett (2000), 
Haybron (2002), Barry (2009), etc.  
 8 This includes the British judge who described 
Gandhi as “saintly” in his judicial order that 
sent Gandhi to prison (Kher 1962). 
 9 More recently, the title Mahatma was con-
ferred on Anna Hazare by the residents of Rale-
gan Siddhi, the village in which Hazare lives 
(Hindustan Times 2011).
10 Orwell acknowledged that Gandhi himself 
never made such claims. So, for Orwell, such 
claims have been made by others.
11  Shepard warns that regarding Gandhi as a saint 
amounts to either making Gandhi  immune to 
criticism or irrelevant to the world.
12 Amiya Chakravarty (1950) suggests that Gandhi’s 
life does not fi t the traditional idea of a reclu-
sive saint at all. Nicholas Gier (2004: 168–73) 
evaluates several aspects of Gandhi’s life to 
argue that Gandhi is a “fl awed saint.”
13 To our knowledge, even the autobiographies of 
famous philosophers such as Bertrand Russell 
(1969–2006) and Willard Quine (1985) are 
seldom used to discuss their philosophical views.
14 In his memoirs concerning Gandhi, the poet–
writer Chakravarty (1950) recounts how Gan-
dhi cherished and nurtured a large circle of 
friends in both his personal and public life. 
However, Gandhi’s personal attributes are not 
really relevant for the discussion here. 
15  There can be a philosophical debate between 
Devji’s disinterested notion of friendship, and 
Cocking and Kennett’s “less moralised” notion 
of friendship, but that is not the concern of the 
present paper. We are neither concerned with 
the concept of friendship itself, nor with the 
concept of friendship that would have appealed 
to Gandhi. Both require very different forms 
of inquiry. Our only concern is to examine 
whether Orwell’s complaint of Gandhi via the 
ascription of saintliness is sustainable.
16 There is much conceptual uncertainty in this 
formulation. Recall what Orwell called “love 
for other,” Wolf calls “welfare for the other,” 
while Gandhi recommends “service of the 
other” (sevā). For now, we are setting aside the 
issue of whether these are equivalent ideas 
because we are yet to clarify what Gandhi 
means and requires in terms of sevā.
17  It is instructive that, except for the religious factor, 
exactly the same picture obtains for revolution-
aries fi ghting for the masses. In fact, even the 
religious factor may apply to activists of libera-
tion theology, Islamic jihadists, Jewish revolu-
tionaries, and the like. The perspective on Gan-
dhi changes radically if Gandhi is viewed not 
as advocating saintliness, but as recommend-
ing a revolutionary spirit.
18 In view of the preceding note and similar exa-
mples of resistance linked to mass welfare, it is 
legitimate to query if the suggested picture of 
moral saints is morally reprehensible at all. As 
noted, an evaluation of the idea of moral saint 
is beyond the scope of this essay.
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